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EU3-IRANIAN NUCLEAN DIPLOMACY: IMPLICATIONS FOR US 







Given present concerns about proliferation in the Middle East, it is useful to analyze the impact of 
EU3-Iranian nuclear diplomacy starting in 2002-2003 and assess its implications for US regional 
policy. A logical place to start is Waltz’s third image,
i the international system, which influenced 
the Europeans to engage Iran. In order to understand the nature of negotiations about nuclear 
politics, it is essential to consider that our understanding of the internal context within Iran is 
defined by bounded rationality. The dynamics of the 2003 agreement with Tehran provide a point 
of reference before considering the ways in which Iranian domestic changes impacted on the 
Europeans diplomatic efforts over time, including the leadership demonstrated by an influential 
negotiator, High Representative Javier Solana. The focus is on the Iranian decision to enrich 
uranium. Action taken by the Europeans as well as the United States, Russia, and China to refer 
Iran to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and to impose sanctions on the regime in 
December 2006 illustrates the limits of EU3 diplomacy. The discussion closes with a perspective 
on the latest step at the United Nations in terms of US regional policy as the conflict with Iraq 
continues.  
 
The EU3 on the World Stage: Why an Ad Hoc Iranian Initiative? 
 
The International Environment as Impetus 
 
The initial question that comes to mind is why the Europeans engaged Iran. The international 
environment provides the answer. The global war on terror dominated American thinking in the 
aftermath of 9/11. Psychologically, the Bush 43 Administration experienced a sea change in its 
policy orientation. US relations with Iran in previous decades were defined by key events that 
influence decisively the collective consciousness in each country: the overthrow of Iranian 
Premier Mossadeq in 1953, which Iran remembers as a CIA/US Embassy-led operation; the US 
Embassy hostage crisis in Iran, which the United States recalls as an attack on American nationals 
and the beginnings of a revolutionary Iranian regime hostile to US interests; and Iran Contra, 
which led to the illegal sale of arms to Iran covertly in exchange for funds channeled to support 
the Contras in Nicaragua under the Reagan Administration. In the 2002 State of the Union, 
President George W. Bush included Iran in the ‘axis of evil’ with Iraq and North Korea. Each 
episode contributes to mutual mistrust, which defines Iranian-US relations.  
        During 2002-03, the larger European countries were divided in their support of the United 
States’ military invasion of Iraq. France and Germany, identified as ‘Old Europe’ by former 
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i Kenneth Waltz. Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.) 
  3Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, opposed the military action. Britain under the leadership 
of Prime Minister Tony Blair, supported the Bush Administration’s military policy. In the 
absence of US engagement with Iran, these countries, Britain, France and Germany, saw an 
opportunity. For the British, the Iran initiative was a way to heal the transatlantic rift that had 
emerged with a degree of mutual recrimination not previously witnessed in public. The French, 
consistent with their European objectives in security policy, wanted to give Europe a voice. The 
Germans wanted to prevent a conflict about nuclear politics. 
EU3 Diplomacy: Strictly Ad Hoc  
 
The EU3 diplomacy was from the beginning a strictly ad hoc initiative. This means that the ‘big 
Three’ were in charge of the diplomatic talks, which are usually coordinated at the level of 
national political directors. One director represents each country. The Council Secretariat of the 
European Union, which has its seat in Brussels, is responsible to assist the EU3, as necessary. The 
Council’s Secretary General, H.E. Javier Solana, a Spaniard, former Secretary General of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and current High Representative of the Union’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), played a unique role in talks with the Iranian 
negotiator responsible for questions of nuclear technology. In terms of leadership, we must 
question the extent to which Mr. Solana speaks for Europe and if his role as an intermediary 
contributes to mistrust between Iran and the Western countries during negotiations.  
Understanding the Iranian Context: The Relevance of Bounded Rationality 
 
One of the most important considerations for those negotiating with Iran on matters of nuclear 
technology is that its internal context is not possible to read well from the outside. Only those 
who possess a deep familiarity with Iran’s culture and history, knowledge of the Persian 
language, and a longstanding experience in the country’s domestic affairs are likely to understand 
more fully where influence resides among its competing centers of institutional power. Iran is not 
a monolith. There are different actors jockeying for power in a relatively decentralized system. 
This is significant for EU3 diplomacy because it indicates that European diplomatic efforts with 
Iran can at best be described in terms of bounded rationality.
ii This means there are natural limits 
to the cognitive abilities of actors, and they do not possess the necessary substantive and 
analytical skills to see through uncertainty to find a mutually acceptable and efficient outcome. In 
this context, we must inquire as to the type of leadership necessary to identify diplomatic 
solutions mutually acceptable to all the actors at the table. A related question must be did the 
leaders of the respective countries at the table possess the political will to negotiate a solution?  In 
the absence of political will, no solution is possible at any level of negotiation. 
 
Nuclear Negotiations: Identifying a Key Issue in Phase I 
 
In late 2002, as Western countries voiced their concern about intended Iranian plans to enrich 
uranium at facilities in Natanz and Arak, officials in Iran, a signatory to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, argued that the country was obligated to inform the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) only after uranium enrichment was about to begin.
iii 
From the Iranian perspective, its actions had never violated the NPT. Iran’s right to nuclear 
technology for peaceful purposes as a member of the NPT regime also obliges the country never 
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  4to develop nuclear weapons. In the cold war era, as Israel, India, and Pakistan edged closer to the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons outside the NPT regime, the Middle East and South East Asia, 
became less secure. The Western countries concern for Iran’s suspension of uranium enrichment 
and willingness to demonstrate transparency in its actions was countered by Iran’s insistence that 
suspension cannot equate with suspending either knowledge or technology access. In the Iranian 
experience, transparency closed the door to the country’s acquisition of nuclear technology 
because the Iranian regime was not an ally of the United States.
iv    
        Iranian President Khatami’s confirmation of developments at the power plants in Natanz and 
Arak in February 2003 set the stage for the EU3-Iranian diplomacy. The EU3 line essentially 
offered Iran a negotiated settlement. The Iranians would promise to reveal the extent of their 
nuclear activities as well as sign and ratify an Additional Protocol, thereby allowing intrusive and 
snap inspections of its nuclear facilities by IAEA experts.
v  
        The EU3 line purposefully aimed to deflect criticism from a skeptical Bush Administration 
dominated by neo-conservative thinkers. Iran could develop a civil nuclear program as long as the 
state provided the required guarantees that it would not seek a military option. It was the 
unwillingness to agree upon the precise nature of the guarantees that foreshadowed the 
difficulties to come in future negotiations. In an atmosphere of general mistrust, nuclear talks 
predicated on Iran’s suspension of uranium enrichment resulted in a stalemate. 
        In the Iranian perspective, nuclear weapons states refuse to give up their arms in violation of 
the NPT regime. The question is one of how to strengthen the NPT regime, which is consistently 
undermined over time by states outside the treaty regime that seek to acquire nuclear weapons 
technology for the purpose of building a bomb. Iranian negotiators refused, in this context, to 
submit to preconditions for negotiations in which a double standard was imposed: one for existing 
nuclear weapons states as well as those states outside the NPT that were allowed to acquire 
nuclear technology to construct a bomb; and another for those states inside the NPT regime that 
sought to acquire nuclear technology and were denied their right to do so.  
        Factions within Iran differed as to the degree of trust and compromise that could be afforded 
to the Europeans. Traditional conservatives and Reformists argued for an agreement to be reached 
with the Europeans to divide the West and maintain European support as a counterweight to US 
ambitions in Iran. Hard liners in Iran were more skeptical of the EU3’s capacity to deliver in the 
absence of US engagement in negotiations and the dominance of American neo-conservative 
thinking in the run-up to the Iraq invasion. The hard liners were convinced that the objective of 
the West since 1979 was the overthrow of the Islamic Republic: regime change.  
        In the agreement signed by the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany, who flew 
to Tehran in October 2003, Iran accepted to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and to 
suspend its plan to enrich uranium pending further final-status negotiations. The EU3 agreed to 
recognize Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear energy and to assist in its development, along 
with the promise to enter a more general dialogue about regional security and stability.
 vi   
        The attention to the matters of detail in the EU3-Iran agreement did not address the root of 
the problem: the lack of trust between Iran and the United States. In the absence of trust, no 
settlement of the nuclear dispute could endure. The Iranians negotiators were concerned that the 
broader framework was missing, and worried that concessions on the nuclear issue would allow 
the United States to move on to another matter of contention, terrorism, or increasingly, Iraq.
 
Aspirations as a Regional Player: Competing Centers of Institutional Power Inside Iran 
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  5The Tehran agreement of November 2003 meant different things to its signatories. For the EU3, a 
confrontation between Iran and the United States had been avoided. Diplomatic engagement had 
succeeded where military action could not. A process of confidence building had begun. For Iran, 
concessions had been secured from the West and an immediate crisis had been overcome. Iran 
awaited a more favorable political climate to reopen negotiations. The EU3 wanted the Additional 
transatlantic relations would be influenced by this outcome.  
        In Iran, the municipal elections of 2003 brought a conservative council to Tehran, full of 
hard liners. The new mayor of Tehran was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The political ascent of Iran’s 
neo-conservatives pointed to a lack of bold Reformist leadership and a loss of the Reformist 
popular base in Iranian society. There were players within Iran who considered their state to be 
the chief beneficiary of the US war on terror. Iraq and Afghanistan were becoming increasingly 
difficult situations to cope with militarily. Iran’s political leverage was growing with time.   
        The situation after 2004 became more complicated. The new Iranian Parliament stacked with 
hard line deputies had no intention of ratifying the Additional Protocol. In their view, the Iranian 
negotiating team was too soft with the EU3 and should insist on the retention of all Iranian 
national rights. The emphasis on nationalism was important. Nuclear development, particularly 
the need to enrich uranium, became an iconic issue that would brook no questions, not even those 
relating to the cost of the venture.
vii    
 
Protocol to be signed and ratified as a matter of security – After the Iraq invasion,  
the future of Nuclear Negotiations: Bringing the Americans on Board in Phase II 
 
As time passed, it became increasingly clear that the Additional Protocol was not going to be 
ratified by the Iranian Parliament elected in 2004. The Iranians sought to push the limits to show 
their own people and critics that they were not going to submit to pressure from the EU3 or the 
United States and to pressure the Europeans to broker a more comprehensive agreement. The 
United States, while eager to delegate responsibility to the EU3, periodically intervened. 
Americans made no secret of their lack of faith in the success of the negotiations. The United 
States would not be happy unless Iran dismantled its nuclear program. The Bush Administration 
also indulged in the language of regime change, which is at the heart of Iran’s security concerns.  
        As negotiations continued, the EU3 made clear that the only objective guarantee that could 
work was a permanent cessation of uranium enrichment. The already small prospects of an 
agreement vanished. When the Americans finally came on board with the EU3, in May 2006, 
opinions were polarized and domestic pressures were mounting. There was a change in the 
structural parameters of negotiations: in 2003 Iranian reformers were in power and the US 
military was not yet bogged down in the midst of protracted civil strife in Iraq. By 2005, Iranian 
hard liners were ascendant and Iraq had shown the limits, in Iranian eyes, of the use of force in 
international politics by any initiator, including the United States, to achieve its intended goals. 
        The EU3 assured the US that if Iran backtracked on the agreement signed in November 
2004, which contained clearer language than the 2003 text and particular emphasis on proving 
that uranium suspension had actually taken place, the EU3 would join with the US in insisting 
that Iran be referred to the Security Council. The Iranian interest is to strengthen the NPT regime. 
Its position is that referral of its nuclear program to the Security Council will not accomplish this 
aim as long as other structural impediments persist in unraveling the regime. The focus of the 
international community should be to encourage those states outside the regime to join the NPT. 
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The Election of Ahmadinejad: From the EU3 to the United Nations Security Council 
 
February 2005 marked a critical phase in Iran’s proposals. In order to address European concerns, 
Iran suggested that the EU3 ask the IAEA ‘to develop technical, legal and monitoring modalities 
as objectives guarantees to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program would remain exclusively for 
peaceful purposes.’
viii The Iranian negotiating team offered a comprehensive deal in March 2005 
amidst political pressures at home and the end of the Khatami presidency in the second term. The 
EU3 rejected the Iranian offer, which led Iran to await a European counteroffer in August. By this 
time negotiations reached a deadlock. The EU3 insisted that Iran cease uranium enrichment as a 
precondition for progress. The Iranians insisted that enrichment was their lawful right as a 
signatory to the NPT regime and that the EU3 was bowing to extraneous pressure from 
Washington. This prevented the Europeans from considering any ‘objective guarantee’ to address 
their concerns about Iranian proliferation. The core disagreement between Tehran and the EU3 is 
about what constitutes an ‘objective guarantee’ that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful.
ix  
        The Iranian right to enrich uranium on its own soil persists as a focal point of divergence in 
negotiations. The Europeans insisted that they should simply supply the required uranium. Iran 
has considered how the enrichment facilities on its territory could benefit the region. Its oil is a 
finite resource, and Iran, with its larger population and greater oil consumption relative to other 
neighbors, has an interest to look for alternative sources of fuel like nuclear energy. Over time 
there has been an 800% increase in the price of nuclear fuel. For economic, political, and strategic 
reasons, Iran does not consider its interest served to be fuel dependent on any other power. 
        The EU3 presented new terms in August 2005, reflecting their dependency on the political 
turn of events as Ahmadinejad assumed the Presidency. It was an offer that avoided the language 
of ‘permanent cessation,’ opting instead for a lengthy ‘temporary suspension.’ In Iran’s view, the 
EU3 package failed to address its rights for the peaceful development of nuclear technology. 
Iranian politics impacted on the negotiations: no one in the West had a good idea how one was to 
deal with the new President, a veteran of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. This 2005 change in the 
domestic context influences the stalemate in negotiations to this day. The 2007 UN sanctions 
being implemented against Iran are targeted at the Revolutionary Guards, who, in the analysis of 
Karim Sadjadpour at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, are emerging as “…the 
most prominent actor in Iran.” In his words, “They're playing an increasingly active role on the 
domestic political scene, have enormous economic assets and interests, are a key player in the 
nuclear program, and are essentially running Iranian activities in Iraq and Lebanon.”
x  
Implications for US Policy in the Middle East 
 
On December 23, 2006 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1737, which cited Iran’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons capability as a ‘grave threat,’ and ‘placing Iran in the small category of states under 
Security Council sanctions.’ In the US explanation of the vote, the resolution’s aim is to send Iran 
an unambiguous message that there are ‘serious repercussions to its continued disregard of its 
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  7obligations’.
xi The Iranian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Dr. M. 
Javad Zarif, addressing the Security Council articulated that bringing Iran’s peaceful nuclear 
program before the Council only achieved the stated objective of a few powers to use the Security 
Council ‘as an instrument of pressure and intimidation to compel Iran to abandon its rights.’
xii   
         In  late  January  2007,  Mohamed  ElBaradei, director general of the United Nations 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) explained that Iranian officials had told him they 
planned to begin installing equipment in an industrial scale plant to enrich uranium. ElBaradei 
made this announcement coupled with a plea to both Tehran and Western nations for all sides to 
take a ‘timeout’ to head off a larger confrontation.
xiii This statement came a week after the 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei publicly called on President Ahmadinejad to stay out of 
all matters nuclear. Mr. Larijani, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and 
Iran’s chief negotiator in nuclear diplomacy, explained that Iran is not going to quit the 
Nonproliferation Treaty regime or bar international inspectors.
xiv  
         Multiple signals coming from Iran point to a need in Washington to examine carefully 
intelligence reports about the situation there as US policymakers grapple with decisions that 
demonstrate bounded rationality. Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Democratic chairman of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, argued in mid-January that the Bush Administration was building 
a case against Tehran even as American intelligence agencies still know little about either Iran’s 
internal dynamics or its intentions in the Middle East.
xv In June 2006, Senator Democratic Leader 
Harry Reid introduced the Iran Intelligence Oversight Act arguing the Bush Administration’s 
increased private and public diplomacy made congressional oversight more important.
xvi
          Given recommendations made by the Iraq Study Group, notably its finding that the US 
engage diplomatically with Iran and Syria, American policy in the region needs to weigh options 
carefully to involve Iraq’s neighbors in assessing how to enhance its stability. In the testimony of 
Zbigniew Brzezinski before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 1, 2007, the 
former National Security Adviser articulated that Iran and Syria have no reason to help the US 
consolidate a permanent regional hegemony.
xvii Lee Hamilton’s analysis before the United States 
House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs speaks to the issue directly that America 
must use its diplomacy to make Iran and Syria part of the solution in the Middle East.
xviii It is 
time for the United States to negotiate with Iran on behalf of stability and American interests in 
Iraq and the broader region.
xix  
          Iran is a unique country, not like those in central and eastern Europe. The ways in which 
the United States can learn from its successful engagement after World War II of ‘soberly 
deterring aggression without initiating hostilities, all the while also exploring the possibility of 
negotiated arrangements’ are not replicable in this situation. The mindset that has evolved in 
Iranian-US relations as a result of the 1979 hostage crisis and the Iran-Contra affair is 
destabilizing. A paradigm change requires a bold diplomatic initiative to lay the foundation for 
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  8Iran’s relations with the United States in the future:
xx the willingness to send a US envoy who 
conveys the political will to negotiate directly with Tehran about the use of its nuclear technology 
exclusively for peaceful purposes. History teaches us that courage and leadership are essential to 
make a visionary initiative, like former President Nixon’s opening to China, possible.
xxi
        America’s relations with Iran are too important strategically to burden with ill-conceived 
notions of regime change or outdated policies of containment. Integration is key in the 21
st 
century global environment.
xxii It is up to the US to place diplomacy at the service of concrete 
objectives with Iran in the Middle East. The unraveling of the NPT regime leads the world away 
from integration through institutions and respect for the rule of law. These are the twin pillars of 
the global system to which US diplomacy contributed at the close of World War II. In the wake 
of the NPT regime’s demise is a likely return to a multi-polar world in which a larger number of 
competing great powers use nuclear weapons to exert dominance in a zero-sum game. This is 
essentially a conflict-oriented scenario more likely to breed fundamentalist extremism than 
prevent its spread. 
        The fate of EU3-Iranian diplomacy illustrates that a paradigm change diplomatically by the 
US can support a broader multilateral effort and begins to demonstrate the resolve of nuclear 
weapons states in nonproliferation. This is arguably the most important challenge of our time to 
which those countries with the greatest responsibilities in the global system must respond in an 
ethical, pragmatic, and visionary manner.
xxiii Relations with Iran demonstrate the dangers of a 
double standard in the real world in which we live,
xxiv a double standard that disadvantages the 
NPT signatories, and offers no disincentive to those countries, including Israel, India, and 
Pakistan, which simply disregard the international norms of the NPT regime. The ways in which 
the nations of the world address or ignore this persistent double standard in negotiations
xxv is the 
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